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Vol. 69 WINTER, 1965 No. 2
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS, JOINT VENTURES,
MARKET EXTENSIONS AND SECTION
7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
By RONALD R. HRUSOFF*
Section 7 of the Clayton Act invalidates any merger that may lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.' In Brown Shoe v. United States,
2
the Supreme Court provided standards to measure the competitive effects
of vertical and horizontal mergers within the meaning of section 7. While
declaring conglomerate mergers also within section 7, the Court made no
attempt to establish a standard for this type of integration. The need for
rational standards to judge a conglomerate merger is urgent due to the
increased utilization of conglomerates in postwar merger activity. 3 Some stand-
ards must be evolved in order to evaluate such mergers in light of section 7.
It is the purpose of this Article to trace the development of the current
tests, point out the inadequacies of their application, and develop a practicable
criteria for judging such mergers. More specifically, the standards applied
to conglomerates, joint ventures and market-extensions will be examined.
The merger standards of Brown Shoe were developed after a long and
tortured history of antitrust litigation. Since the enactment of the Sherman
Act in 1890, the Supreme Court has attempted to formulate standards for
judging other than blatant combinations. In 1911 Mr. Chief Justice White
laid the ground work in Standard Oil Co. v. United States4 and United
States v. American Tobacco Co.,5 for the Court adopted his fourteen-year-old
dissent in United States v. Trans-Missouri Ass'n.6 In Trans-Missouri he
announced the "rule of reason" test, whereby each merger would be judged
* B.A., 1957, University of California; LL.B., 1963, Georgetown University; mem-
ber of the District of Columbia and Virginia Bars; attorney for the Federal Communica-
tions Commission; former economist, Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed in
this Article are those of the author, and not those of the United States Government or
any of its agencies.
1. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
2. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
3. Clark, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 36 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 255, 267 (1961).
4. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
5. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
6. 166 U.S. 290, 343 (1897).
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individually on a "case-by-case" basis. 7 While market shares were accorded
great importance, all other economic factors were also considered. Purely
mechanical tests were avoided.
8
Over the years the "rule of reason" test has eroded. This theory was
first modified into the "reasonable-probability" test,
9 requiring that a merger
be invalidated if there is a reasonable probability that it will substantially
lessen competition.' 0 The final modification, as enunciated in Standard Oil
of Cal. v. United States," was the "quantitative-substantiality" test.
12 Under
this test a merger is invalid whenever "competition has been foreclosed in a
substantial share of the line of commerce affected.'1
In Standard Stations it was determined that a tying agreement fore-
closing 6.7 per cent of the sales in the relevant area was sufficient to violate
section 3 of the Clayton Act. 14 No economic factors were considered; nor need
they be, for "once it appeared that the contracts embraced a substantial share of
the market, the inquiry was at an end."' 5 This standard was generally accepted
by the antitrust bar;16 some members would have been less demanding,
however, and set the cut-off point at twenty, rather than six-or-seven per
cent.
17
This test has three advantages: simplicity, predictability and work-
ability. All are particularly valued in the antitrust field, for corporations
could enter into desirable combinations without fear of prosecution simply
7. See id. at 343-73.
8. See Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.
245 (1961) ; Weston, Antitrust Highlights, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. 217 n.24 (1961).
9. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932) ; International Shoe Co.
v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) ; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945). See generally ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 118 (1955).
10. See Handler, Quantitative Substantiality and the Celler-Kefauver Act-A Look
at the Record, 7 MERCER L. REV. 283 (1955).
11. 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (more popularly known as the Standard Stations case);
cf. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
12. 337 U.S. at 314.
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 305. As section 3 has the same preamble as section 7, it was believed that
decisions under one applied to the other.
Congress not only indicated that "the tests of illegality [under section 7] are
intended to be similar to those which the courts have applied in interpreting the
same language as used in other sections of the Clayton Act," but also chose for
§ 7 language virtually identical to that of § 3 of the Clayton Act ....
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962).
15. IV HOFFMAN, ANTITRUST LAW & TECHNIQUE 369 (1963).
16. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 315-17 (1960).
17. See Lewyn & Mann, Ten Years under the New Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
A Lawyer's Practical Approach to the Case Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1067, 1079-80 (1961);
Markham, Merger Policy under New Section 7: A Six Year Appraisal, 43 VA. L. REV.
489, 521-22 (1955) ; Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV.
176, 182 (1955). See also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363
n.38 (1963).
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by adhering to this ruling. The antitrust agencies,' 8 similarly, could move
swiftly and with a fair certainty of success to block those mergers beyond
the pale. 19
The general inflexibility which gives the "quantitative-substantiality"
test its principal advantage, however, is also its greatest weakness. This
inflexibility has prevented combinations between failing companies, 20 and
also has barred small companies that were forced to compete with national
giants from combining, because of the resulting high degree of concentration
in a particular local market.21 Thus, companies were prevented from combin-
ing to become large enough to compete with the dominant firm in the
industry.
A further shortcoming of this test appears in its application to the
integration of non-competing firms. In United States v. du Pont,22 du Pont
had acquired twenty-three per cent of General Motors' common stock shortly
after the First World War. By the time the case came to trial in the early
fifties, du Pont was supplying General Motors with better than fifty per
cent of its automotive finishes and fabric needs. Du Pont increased its
annual sales by twenty-three million dollars as a result. The Supreme Court
found a violation of section 7, and ordered du Pont to dispose of its General
Motors holdings. This decision was received less than enthusiastically ;23
two objections were commonly raised: (1) no merger was involved, and
(2) after forty years the Government was estopped from bringing an
action. Notwithstanding these two objections, an examination of the per-
centage of the relevant market foreclosed will reflect the deficiency in the
"quantitative-substantiality" theory. The paint industry is very large, and
automotive paint is directly competitive with many other kinds of paint. It
would seem then, that the capturing of a twenty-three million dollar market
18. The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission have concurrent
jurisdiction over the greater part of the Clayton Act. Cf. United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 342-44 (1963).
19. See Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States, 343 U.S. 922 (1952); Crown Zel-
lerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962) ;
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where the
decisions were based solely on a fixed percentage of market foreclosure.
20. See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) ; Beegle v. Thompson,
138 F.2d 875, 880-81 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1944) ; United States v.
Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). See generally Conner, Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
The "Failing Company" Myth, 49 GEo. L.J. 84 (1960).
21. See Bok, op. cit. supra note 16, at 317-18. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 325 (1962), and United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 589
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), by implication support this conclusion in finding that a high concentra-
tion within a submarket or limited area is sufficient to destroy a merger.
22. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
23. See, e.g., Bromley, Business' View of the du Pont-General Motors Decision, 46
GEo. L.J. 646 (1958).
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is of no consequence; for it represents less than one per cent of the market.
The Supreme Court, however, found an unrealistic market in order to apply
this test; General Motors' paint purchases were considered the market. Yet,
all that occurred was the foreclosure of other paint companies from selling
to General Motors. In reality all that was lost to these other paint companies
was less than one per cent of their market. It makes no difference, then,
what proportion of any given firm's purchases or sales is controlled by
another firm; control is only relevant when compared to the total market.
Thus, the quantitative substantiality test was inadequate to judge non-com-
peting firms as evidenced by the du Pont decision.
The "quantitative-substantiality" test was soon to be considered in-
applicable to section 7 cases. In Pillsbury Mills, Inc.,24 the Federal Trade
Commission used the reasoning of Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 25 to hold that not only the percentage of the market
foreclosed, but all significant economic factors should be considered in de-
termining the legality of a merger under section 7.26
The Supreme Court provided a criteria for resolving the legitimacy of
mergers by accepting the Pillsbury approach in Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co.,27 and Brown Shoe. In Brown Shoe, Mr. Chief Justice Warren
listed the following factors to be considered: concentration within the industry
itself;28 the industries' and the defending corporations' trend toward con-
centration ;29 the internal structure of the firm ;30 the absolute size of the
firm;31 the reason behind the merger;32 and the opinions of the merging
firms' competitors regarding the effect the combination will have on them. 83
The Court further recognized that section 7 would not impede the merger
of small companies,3 4 failing companies 35 and certain public utilities having
requirement contracts that foreclosed a portion of the market.36
24. 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953). The test was limited to section 3 cases.
25. 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
26. See 50 F.T.C. at 564-66.
In no merger case-horizontal, vertical or conglomerate-can a "quantitative
substantiality" rule substitute for the market tests Section 7 prescribes ... no one
pattern of proof can meet the requirements of all cases. The determination of
the legality of a merger will in every case require some study of the markets
affected, the companies involved in an acquisition in relation to those markets,
and the merger's immediate and longer range consequences for competition.
ATT'y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 122-23 (1955).
27. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
28. 370 U.S. at 334.
29. Id. at 332.
30. Id. at 344.
31. Id. at 331.
32. Id. at 329.
33. Id. at 344.
34. Id. at 319.
35. Ibid., in effect affirming International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
36. 370 U.S. at 329-30. See also Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
320 (1961).
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Although the Brown Shoe approach has merit because of its flexibility;
it is far from perfect. It will produce a wide open record and a fantastic
drain on the court's time and the defendant's finances. In addition, this test
fails to indicate the relative weight that should be given to each factor;
no real degree of pre-merger predictability is provided. Although Brown
Shoe disposed of both vertical and horizontal mergers, it did not adequately
deal with the more refined combinations. The Court has indicated its aware-
ness, however, that market-extensions, joint-ventures, and conglomerates
are not adaptable to market-structure analysis.
37
At the outset it is necessary to distinguish the conglomerate s from the
horizontal and the vertical merger. A horizontal merger occurs when two
firms producing identical or similar goods combine.39 A vertical merger
is effected when a business acquires either a supplier or a customer. 40 The
pure conglomerate occurs when two firms which neither manufacture com-
peting products nor supply each other merge. Pure conglomerates are rare,
however; the more common species is a conglomerate with some horizontal
or vertical aspects. A horizontal-conglomerate is the result of a merger
between corporations with similar but non-competitive products. While the
products are similar and can easily be sold together, if economically analyzed,
they often cannot be substituted and more often have no cross-elasticity of
demand. The Procter and Gamble Corporation's acquisition of the Clorox
Corporation, the former being the nation's largest seller of washday products
and the latter the country's largest manufacturer of household bleaches,
provides the best example in recent years. In this type of union, one of
the companies is able to absorb the new product into an already existing
marketing structure with little extra overhead. This advantage is unavail-
able to those firms involved in a pure conglomerate merger. General Dynamics
37. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States
v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) ; United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964).
38. See generally FTC, REPORT OF THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT
59-63 (1948) ; Address by Adelman, Meeting of the Antitrust Section of Association of
the Bar of New York, November 13, 1956; EDWARDS, CONGLOMERATE BIGNESS AS A
SOURCE OF POWER, IN BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 345-59 (1955);
Barnes, The Primacy of Competition and the Brown Shoe Decision, 51 GEo. L.J. 706,
715 (1963) ; Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEO. L.J. 672
(1958) ; Hale, Diversification: Impact of Monopoly Policy upon Multi-Product Firms,
98 U. PA. L. REV. 320 (1950) ; Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversi-
fication and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REV. 433 (1963) ; Markham, op. cit. supra note
17, at 494; Stigler, op. cit. supra note 17, at 184; Note, Conglomerate Mergers under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1265 (1963).
39. No distinction is made between firms actually competing and those so geo-
graphically isolated that they are non-competitive. The latter type is referred to as a
market-extension, see p. 133 infra.




is a good illustration of a conglomerate with vertical features. A few years
ago it gained control of the Liquid Carbonic Corporation. At that time,
Carbonic was the third largest domestic producer of industrial gases.41
General Dynamics could use Carbonic oxygen and acetylene in its operations
and undoubtedly became a large customer of its subsidiary. Even so, at
least in the short run, the gas market did not lose a competitor. This was
partly due to plants located where they could not serve General Dynamics
and partly to the parent's inability to use the nitrogen generated as an oxygen




Although there is no dearth of theory on the subject,43 still, the economic
effect of a conglomerate merger is uncertain. This fact is not surprising, since
conglomerates were rare before 195044 and virtually unknown until the early
41. MOODY, INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2211 (1964). The Justice Department is attempt-
ing to upset this merger, United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
11 45062 (1962).
42. The Reynolds Metal Company recently put together a most subtle vertical-
conglomerate. It acquired the Tilo Roofing Company, a distributor of asphalt roofing.
Reynolds will now operate this company, as it has at least one other, so it can sell its
aluminum roofing through Tilo's 550 odd salesmen. Therefore, a merger that started out
as a pure conglomerate has the potential of easily becoming a hybrid, if Reynolds uses
its step-child as an aluminum distributor. See MOODY, INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2864 (1964).
Some mergers involve very complex product lines. Frequently, while they are
principally conglomerates, they have both vertical and horizontal features. Georgia
Pacific's recent acquisition of the Crosset Timber Corporation is an example. Georgia
Pacific is the nation's largest cutter of redwood, a substantial factor in the western fir
market, a large plywood producer, a formidable force within the hardwood flooring field,
and a minor paper manufacturer. Crosset cut southern pine and manufactured paper.
Georgia Pacific expects to add Crosset's pine to its already bulging catalogue of timber
products-the horizontal aspect; its own immense stumpage reserves will, at least in
theory, be used to supply Crosset's craft paper plant-the vertical-backward aspect. See
MooDY, supra at 2826, 2827 (1964). The FTC filed a complaint charging that this acquisi-
tion was a violation of section 7. Georgia Pacific then entered into a consent decree on
July 4, 1964, which prohibits it from making further acquisitions and requires it to sell
craft paper to Crosset's former customers. Georgia-Pacific Corp. and Georgia Pacific
Paper Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. % 16929 (1964).
43. See note 38 supra.
44. Only 16 merger cases decided before 1950 have been found: United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) ; Arrow-Hart & Hageman Elec. Co. v. FTC,
291 U.S. 587 (1934) ; International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) ; United States
v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927) ; FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274
U.S. 619 (1927); Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926); United States v.
Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922) ; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251
U.S. 417 (1920) ; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918) ; United
States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912) : Northern Sec. Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197 (1904) ; V. Vivaudou Inc. v. FTC, 54 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1931); Temple
Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1931) ; United States v. Celanese Corp.
of America, 91 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11
F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935) ; United States v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 47 F.2d 288
(E.D. Mo. 1931).
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1960's. The recent cases of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,46
and United States v. Continental Can Co.46 illustrate this vacuum.
The Alcoa case arose from the Aluminum Company of America's ac-
quisition of the Rome Cable Corporation in 1959. Alcoa produced 27.8 per
cent of the nation's supply of aluminum conductors. Rome received ninety
per cent of its sales from copper products; it also produced a small amount
of aluminum conductors-il.3 per cent of the total industry. The merger
would appear from this combination of copper and aluminum to be a hori-
zontal-conglomerate. 47 The district court treated the merger as a conglomerate
and held there was no section 7 violation. 48 The Supreme Court reversed,
however, treating it as an ordinary horizontal merger. 49 The relevant market
was found to be aluminum conductors, 50 and it was held that such an addition
to the leading firm's share was in violation of section 7.51 As a result of
this approach, the Court avoided the conglomerate aspect. Only negatively
does Alcoa shed any light on the problem; for it appears that only con-
glomerates involving "big" companies with the slightest product overlap will
be destroyed. Thus, to avoid application of this decision, future merging
companies should spin off any overlapping activities.
In the Continental Can case, the merging firms, Continental Can and
the Hazel-Atlas Glass Company had no common product; Continental Can
manufactured tin cans, and Hazel-Atlas made glass bottles.52 Shortly after
Continental Can announced it had purchased Hazel-Atlas, the Justice Depart-
ment petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California to enjoin the sale. The injunction was refused ;53 the court
did not believe a 1950 consent decree entered against Continental Can
covered the proposed merger. The litigation then shifted to the District Court
for the Southern District of New York. There the court denied the motion
for a prohibitory injunction without an opinion.54 As a result, the parties
merged in 1956. In a subsequent trial on the merits, the district court,
again without an opinion, refused to find their action illegal.55 The court
agreed to reconsider its initial decision, however, in light of the subsequent
45. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
46. 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
47. See p. 117 supra.
48. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
49. 377 U.S. at 271.
50. Id. at 277.
51. Id. at 278.
52. It appears that this integration was a pure conglomerate, as distinguished from
the horizontal-conglomerate in Alcoa. See p. 117 supra.
53. United States v. Continental Can Co., 143 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
54. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
55. Id. at 766.
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decision in Brown Shoe.56 In this second trial, 57 the Government advanced
two theories of illegality: First, viewing the merger horizontally, the relevant
product line was "drink containers"-beer cans and bottles, thereby giving
Continental Can a dominant position within the industry; second, as a con-
glomerate, the merger was illegal without any showing of market dominance,
for this increase in assets gave Continental the potential to destroy its
smaller competitors. The court was reluctant to accept "drink containers"
as the relevant product; however, this broad product classification was as-
sumed, arguendo, as valid, and still the court said that this horizontal
merger would not substantially lessen competition as there remained several
active competitors. Regarding the second contention, the court pointed out
that Continental's potential abusive power could not be easily utilized, for
there was a formidable competitor in each line, cans or bottles.5 s
The Supreme Court, however, found the relevant product to be drink
containers. 59 Cans and bottles were considered interchangeable due to the
"high degree of cross-elasticity of demand" between them. It was further
concluded that there was sufficient "rivalry between cans and glass contain-
ers"61 to lead the Court to believe that there was only one market-con-
tainers.62 Continental Can increased its percentage of the combined container
market from 21.9 to 25 per cent6 3 through this acquisition, and because each
industry is highly concentrated, the Court found that this increase in one
of the industry's larger firms violated section 7.64
By restricting the market in Alcoa and expanding it in Continental
Can, the Court again demonstrated great flexibility: flexibility to determine
the relevant market; and flexibility to avoid ruling on a difficult question.
As a result, the legality of the conglomerate continues to remain untested.
There are two ways of viewing the economic effect of a conglomerate
merger. One theory is that such a combined firm may be far less efficient
than each of its divisions were prior to the merger ;65 managers will not
be able to efficiently operate two diverse businesses;66 conflicts will arise
56. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
57. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
58. In 1956, Continental, after merger, had assets of $633 million while American
Can (cans) had $499 million and Owens Illinois Glass Co. (bottles) had $403 million.
MOODY, INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2929, 2413, 2812 (1957).
59. 378 U.S. 441, 449-50 (1964).
60. Id. at 450-51.
61. Id. at 456.
62. Id. at 457-58.
63. Id. at 461.
64. Ibid.
65. Blair, op. cit. supra note 38, at 679. See also Hale, op. cit. Supra note 38.
66. Blair, op. cit. supra note 38, at 680-83; Weldon, The Multi-Product Firm, 14
CAN. J. OF EcoN. & POL. Sci. 176 (1948).
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within the company; and profits will decline. The other theory is that a
combined firm will be able to increase its profits, better utilize its managerial
talent, more effectively advertise, enhance the possibility of purchasing auto-
matic data process equipment and become a more attractive borrower,
thereby reducing its interest charges.
0 7
When a corporation does realize increased profits because of an acquisi-
tion, it can do one or a combination of three things: It may distribute the
profits as dividends, reinvest, or return them to the consumer through
reduced prices or improved quality. An increase in dividends will not effect
consumers or competition. Reinvesting results in no immediate economic
effect; however, these funds should eventually generate additional earnings
that will effect competition. This may be the philosophy underlying the
du Pont decision.68 Du Pont's ownership of twenty-three per cent of General
Motors brought it dividends in excess of its own earnings.6 9 The greater
portion of these dividends were reinvested in the du Pont Chemical Corpora-
tion. This flow of new capital, taxed at seven and one-half, rather than
fifty-two per cent,70 allowed expansion into one new product line after another,
resulting in a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 7 1 Thus, the antitrust
agencies and the courts will not be favorably disposed toward a merger that
effectively utilizes these funds and creates anti-competitive effects, i.e., a
mature capital-generating firm that purchases a growing capital-consuming
firm so that capital flows to the latter, resulting in the latter's dominance
in its industry. Lastly, to return profits to the consumer will always effect
competition, for other firms in the industry will also have to reduce prices
or improve their quality. As a result a firm must either become more efficient
or go out of business. If public policy is to produce efficient industry, this
result is desirable; conglomerate mergers should only be prohibited, if the
policy is to preserve competition at any expense, including the retention
of marginal firms.
67. EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 17, at 348.
68. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
69. Du Pont was receiving annual dividends in excess of $150 million while its sales
to General Motors were only $23 million a year. MooDY, INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1176
(1964).
70. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 243 requires that every corporation include 15% of all
dividends received into its gross income.
71. The Court in the second du Pont case, 366 U.S. 316 (1961) found a section 7
violation even though du Pont was willing to sterilize its stock, i.e., relinquish its voting
power. Mr. Justice Brennan reasoned:
If the suggestion is permanent loss of the vote, it would create a large and
permanent separation of corporate ownership from control, which would not only
run directly counter to accepted principles of corporate democracy, but also
reduce substantially the number of voting General Motors shares, absolute ma-
jority to obtain working control, perhaps creating new antitrust problems for




The entire industry is also affected when a giant firm attempts to
increase its profits by illegal or unfair means. An attempt to raise prices
by stabilizing competition, or to gain a larger portion of total industry sales
may be made. In either case, it hopes to maximize its profits. Stabilization of
the industry may be accomplished by pegging prices at artificially high levels
while allotting sales areas. Price leadership is the most common method.
Whenever the dominant firm announces a price change, the other companies
generally follow rather than challenge; the more efficient firms reaping un-
warranted profits. Even more reprehensible than price-fixing is an active
attempt by the number one firm to increase its share of a non-expanding
market. An increase in the giant's share of the market, if it is operating at
less than capacity, will lower fixed costs and increase profits; also, the weaker
firms will be driven out of business. In past years price-cutting or hidden
rebates were the devices used to carry out these motives. Today tying agree-
ments and reciprocal sales contracts are used. Extensive promotional cam-
paigns in a competing firm's vulnerable areas are also effective. While a
giant conglomerate is no different than any other giant in its anticompetitive
propensities, special problems are created in judging them. Two approaches
are available: size, or post-merger activities.
Size
Only conglomerate mergers involving at least one sizeable firm will
cause concern to the antitrust agencies. Mergers between small,7 2 insignifi-
cant 73 or de minimus74 companies are outside the prohibition of section 7.
Thus, a determination must be made as to the size of the companies involved
in order to determine the applicability of section 7.
While the famous holding, "the law does not make mere size an
offense,"75 has not been overruled, the Supreme Court has recently cast
doubt upon the validity of this statement. The Court stated: "Where a
merger is of such a size as to be inherently suspect, elaborate proof of market
structure, market behavior and probable anticompetitive effects may be dis-
pensed with in view of § 7 's design to prevent undue concentration. '76
72. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962). See also Petro,
The Growing Threat of Antitrust, Fortune, Nov. 1962, p. 128.
73. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
74. United States v. du Pont, 353 U.S. 586, 592 (1957).
75. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1927);
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
76. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 459 (1964). "Although the
government denies it, the action in its underlying essentials is aimed at 'bigness' per se."
United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 821 (N.D. Cal. 1963). In Lewyn & Mann,
Ten Years under the New Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Lawyer's Practical Approach
to the Case Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1067 (1961), the authors attempt to justify du Pont
by rationalizing that "this decision may well be based upon the intuitive conclusion that
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Size as the absolute measure of a merger's legality is a poor criteria. It
is irrelevant that a corporation has a certain amount of assets or sales.
A salt company or a winery with sales and assets of 10,000,000 dollars would
be large, while the same size firm in the automobile or steel industries would
be insignificant. Suppose American Motors Corporation takes over a motor-
cycle manufacturer, it would be a giant in the motorcycle industry; however,
it remains a pigmy as an automobile builder. Thus, identification of the large
firm remains a problem, if size is the desired approach. The manner in which
the courts have either evaded or vaguely mentioned this issue is illustrated
in Brown Shoe. The Supreme Court found Kinney's sales of 18 million
large enough to qualify as "other than a small firm."'77 No attempt was made,
however, to define a "small firm" or to indicate when a company no longer
is entitled to be called small. As there have only been a few other cases
involving smaller companies, 78 it appears that something slightly less than
18 million indicates the outer limits of the "small firm."
The "percentage of the relevant market foreclosed" standard can only be
utilized when there is some product overlap between the merging companies, 79
for without a product overlap a market foreclosure cannot take place. Thus,
a pure conglomerate cannot be judged by this test.80 The bulk of conglomerates
have some common products, however, indicating that this test does have
importance in the area of conglomerates.
Important to the application of this test are the Standard Stations and
Tampa Electric cases. In Standard Stations, a 6.7 per cent foreclosure was
held illegal,81 while in Tampa Electric, a .77 per cent foreclosure was con-
sidered legal.8 2 These cases seem to bracket the area; thus, leaving many
mergers with high foreclosures clearly outside the range of discussion.8 3 The
courts, however, have had difficulty in judging a merger falling within this
size alone is bad." Id. at 1080. But see United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932),
where the Court stated: "Mere size, according to the holding of this court, is not an
offense ... but size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when
the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in the past." Id. at 116.
77. 370 U.S. at 319.
78. A. G. Spaulding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 587 (3d Cir. 1962) (sales of $23
million) ; Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961) (Erie was too
small to be listed in MOODY, INDUSTRIAL MANUAL, but was listed in the 1960 DUNN &
BRADSTREET DIRECTORY at 307, although no sales nor asset data was given; Leslie Salt
Co., 59 F.T.C. 1278, 1281 (1961) (sales of $12 million and assets of $22 million) ; Brillo
Mfg. Co., 56 F.T.C. 1672, 1676 (1960) (assets of $5 million).
79. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
80. See pp. 115-16 supra.
81. 337 U.S. at 295.
82. 365 U.S. at 333.
83. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964) ; United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) ; Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC,
296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
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bracketed range. The du Pont case illustrates how the Court avoided ruling
on the legality of a 3.5 per cent market foreclosure by unrealistically narrow-
ing the "relevant product market."8 4 Yet five years later the Court had no
hesitancy in finding illegal foreclosures of 1.2 per cent in Brown Shoe8 5 and
1.3 per cent in Alcoa. 6 While it is apparent that mergers involving foreclosures
of at least 1.2 per cent of the market will be invalidated, the Court has shown
from the above decisions the need for more effective guideposts to effectuate
antitrust policies. As a practical matter the business community must know
with some degree of certainty what actions will be challenged.
It is apparent from Alcoa and Continental Can that the antitrust agencies
will strain to find a giant industry's acquisition illegal. In Alcoa the Justice
Department argued vehemently for a narrow market; it wanted aluminum
conductors rather than conductors (aluminum and copper) to be the market.
In Continental Can, it argued just as strongly for a wide market; con-
tainers generally, instead of beer cans and beer bottles, was urged as the
appropriate market. One similarity exists between these cases: the principal
firm was a giant with assets nearing the billion dollar mark. Thus, it is sub-
mitted that any 100 million dollar firm acquiring a 10 million dollar company
will be questioned as to its anticompetitive effects. A successful challenge to
the combination will probably result, if the slightest product overlap
exists.8 7 This approach will only work, however, where there is a common
product. A new theory will be required when two firms merge with no product
overlap, such as United States Steel and Coca-Cola.
Post-Merger Activities
While a conglomerate could be considered illegal if it has the potential
to destroy competition, it could also be attacked on the basis of its post-merger
performance. The use of abusive or illegal tactics would justify filing a sec-
tion 7 complaint.88 Although such an approach is not presently practiced,
it is not without precedent; section 2 of the Sherman Act was enacted to
prohibit such tactics.8 9
The Court in Standard Oil and American Tobacco also recognized such
activities as pooling agreements, price-fixing and patent control to be anti-
84. See pp. 115-16 supra.
85. 370 U.S. at 303.
86. 377 U.S. at 274.
87. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
88. See Reynolds Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743 (1960), aff'd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
89. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). See HALE & HALE,
MARKET POWER, SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 18-88 (1958) ; see generally
Note, Conglomerate Mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1265,
1270 (1963).
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competitive. 90 In condemning the trusts, the Court undoubtedly was influ-
enced by these abusive activities. Several years later the Court in United
States v. United States Steel Corp.,91 concluded:
The corporation is undoubtedly, of impressive size and it takes
an effort of resolution not to be affected by it or to exaggerate its
influence. But we must adhere to the law and the law does not make
mere size an offense or the existence of unexerted power an offense.
It, we repeat, requires overt acts and trusts to its prohibition of them
and its power to repress or punish them.
92
This approach was believed extinct prior to the amendment of section 7.93
The turning point was considered to be United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America ;94 but an analysis of Judge Learned Hand's opinion indicates the
contrary, for Alcoa was actively engaged in these abusive tactics. 95 The
turning point was not reached until the du Pont decision, where Mr. Justice
Brennan was able to show that du Pont was only in a position to abuse its
power, not that it actually had done so.96 Nor was he able to show that it had
gained control of General Motors, or its business, through undesirable tactics.
Since this decision, the abuse doctrine has not consciously been used by the
Supreme Court in a monopoly or merger case; but neither has it been rejected.
It is submitted that this approach of viewing actual anti-competitive activities
as the principal criteria in judging conglomerates has been used by the Federal
Trade Commission and the lower courts. Three cases are illustrative: FTC
v. Reynolds Metals Co. ;97 The Procter & Gamble Co. ;98 and United States v.
Continental Can.99
The Reynolds case arose out of Reynold's purchase of the Arrow Brands
90. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) ; United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
91. 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
92. Id. at 451. The Court in United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S.
693 (1927), further stated:
It does not appear that since the entry of the consent decree the International
Company has used its capital and resources ... for the purpose or with the effect
of restraining and suppressing the interstate trade in harvesting machinery; that
it has at any time reduced the prices of harvesting machines below cost, for the
purpose of driving out its competitors; or that it has at any time controlled and
dominated the trade in harvesting machinery by the regulation of prices.
Id. at 707-08.
93. HALE & HALE, op. cit. supra note 89, at 93, 94.
94. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
95. Id. at 430-31. Alcoa built an excessive number of plants, keeping supply in
excess of demand; id. at 431, bought out competitors; id. at 432-34, purchased all avail-
able bauxite deposits; id. at 436, raised price of sheet while maintaining price of fabricated
products forcing out other fabricators.
96. 353 U.S. at 607.
97. 56 F.T.C. 743 (1960), aff'd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
98. 3 TRADE REG. REP. f 15773 (FTC order 1962).
99. 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
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Corporation. Prior to 1956 Arrow Brands, as well as some eight or ten other
firms, purchased "jumbo" rolls of aluminum foil from Reynolds, Alcoa or
Kaiser. These rolls were decorated, printed and reduced to a size suitable for
florist shop use. In 1956, the year before the acquisition, Arrow accounted
for approximately thirty-three per cent of the national output of printed florist
foil. Through the use of its superior resources, Reynolds was able to sub-
stantially increase its market share at the expense of Arrow's competitors
within a short time. This feat was accomplished primarily by price-cutting.
The Commission considered this factor as well as the percentage of the market
foreclosed before ordering Reynolds to divest itself of this subsidiary.) ° On
appeal the Commission's ruling was upheld. 011 The circuit court could have
based its opinion on Brown Shoe,10 2 ruling that florist foil was a sub-market of
aluminum foil and that a vertical foreclosure of one-third of this sub-market
was in itself sufficient to invoke the prohibitions of section 7. Instead, the
court chose to go further:
It is sufficient if the Commission shows the acquisition had the
capacity or potentiality to lessen competition. That such a potential
emerged from the combination of Reynolds and Arrow was enough
to bring it within Section 7. But the Commission on substantial evi-
dence had additionally provided us with a finding of actual anticom-
petitive effect, where as an apparent consequence of retroactive price
reductions for Arrow foil after the acquisition of florist foil sales of 5
of Arrow's 7 competitors had by 1957 dropped from 14o to 47%
below 1955 sales. Arrow's sales over the same period increased by
18.9%.103
In Procter and Gamble, there was a merger of the Clorox Corporation,
the largest household bleach firm, with Procter and Gamble, the largest
manufacturer of household soaps and cleaners. Clorox had two national and
several smaller regional competitors. Disproportionate promotion by Procter
and Gamble through extensive newspaper, television, and radio advertising
severely damaged Clorox's competitors. Initially, the hearing examiner found
there was no violation of section 7 ;104 however, on a rehearing prompted by the
Commission's reversal105 of his initial decision, the hearing examiner found
a section 7 violation.0 6 The Commission affirmed, 0 7 relying heavily on
100. 56 F.T.C. at 743.
101. 309 F.2d at 223.
102. See 370 U.S. at 294, 325, 343-44.
103. 309 F.2d at 230. (Emphasis added.)
104. Initial decision, June 17, 1960.
105. 58 F.T.C. 1203 (1961), order remanding to hearing examiner.
106. 3 TRADE REaG. REP. ff 15773 (FTC order 1962).
107. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16673 (1963).
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Procter and Gamble's post-merger activities of price-cutting and advertising
to justify its decision.' 0 8
Continental Can is the third case indicating the importance of actual
anti-competitive activities in judging a conglomerate. The district court in
finding no section 7 violation stated:
The [G]overnment conceded that it had no proof that any person
or firm, seller or buyer, suffered any actual injury as a result of this
acquisition, although the trial took place more than three and one
half years after it occurred. There were no complaining witnesses.
None of the 78 witnesses whom the Government placed on the stand
testified to any actual anti-competitive effects or tendency to
monopoly.' 0 9
While it is true the Supreme Court reversed this case on appeal,110 they
never dismissed the conglomerate aspect of the case. The case was decided
solely on the basis of the relevant market affected."' It is submitted that
the district court's observations are still valid and should at least be persuasive
when a true conglomerate is being evaluated.
The abusive tactics which were considered in the above mentioned cases
are compartmented into three distinct categories. The first are those group of
activities which are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act :112
tying contracts, n3 price-fixing agreements," 4 and market divisions. 115 The
108. Id. 1 16673, at 21569-72 (price-cutting and the effect of advertising). See also
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), where it was stated that
"such tremendous advertising . . . is . . . a widely published warning that these companies
possess and know how to use a powerful offensive and defensive weapon against new
competition. New competition dare not enter such a field, unless it be well supported by
comparable national advertising." Id. at 797. A complaint has also been issued against
the General Foods Corp. for acquiring a steel wool company. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16804
(1963).
109. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
110. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
111. Ibid.
112. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) ; Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal.,
377 U.S. 13 (1964). See also United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255 (1920) ;
United States v. Reading R.R., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Del. Lack. &
W.R.R., 238 U.S. 516 (1915).
113. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) ; Standard Oil Co. of Cal.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392 (1947) ; I.B.M. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) ; cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (requirements contract) ; but see Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (which seems to have
been limited to its facts by Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)).
Mr. Chief Justice Warren discusses the problem and compares tying agreements to
vertical foreclosures in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-24, 328-31
(1962).
114. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) ; Paul v. United States,
371 U.S. 245 (1963) ; United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) ; United
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second is limited to selective price-cutting; a violation of the Robinson-
Patman Act.116 The third comprises activities in the nature of oppressing
small competitors. While these practices are not illegal per se, they are un-
ethical; reciprocal sales agreements, intensive advertising and loans to cus-
tomers 17 are illustrative.
An illegal tying contract exists when a seller conditions or ties the
purchase of one commodity upon the purchase of another product, thereby
forcing the buyer to give up the purchase of a substitute for the tied product,
and destroying the free access of competing suppliers of the tied product to
the consuming market."18 A price-fixing violation will be found where a seller
refuses to sell to customers who will not resell at the seller's suggested prices;
the illegality lies in the means to which the producer secures adherence to his
suggested prices. This refusal to sell is leverage power forcing the buyer to
purchase the product. A market division is created where several corpora-
tions, to protect each other's market and eliminate outside competition,
allocate trade territories among themselves.1 9 Such per se activities are
notorious; their anti-competitive effects can readily be seen.
Reciprocal buying agreements usually result from the establishment of
a second product line, whereby two or more firms purchase exclusively from
each other. This procedure is well adapted to conglomerates. As has been
noted :
Diversification not only increases the number of opportunities for
reciprocal buying; it increases their magnitude. A single-line pro-
ducer, even though a near-monopolist, may buy so little of some
material that reciprocal buying has little influence on suppliers as po-
tential customers. But by diversifying-making other products re-
States v. Paramount Theatres Corp., 334 U.S. 131 (1958) ; United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392 (1927). Contra, Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
115. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) ; cf. FTC
v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ; Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d
29 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 904 (1963) ; FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S.
746 (1945) (the market effectively was divided by the use of a basing point system).
116. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
117. Cf. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951) ; Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948) ; Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316
U.S. 556 (1942) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
118. A variation is found when one or more firms control a second company, requir-
ing it to purchase exclusively from them. United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186
F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951) ; see generally United States v.
General Motors Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45063 (1963) ; United States v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. J 45062 (1962). See Handler, Emerging Antitrust
Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REv. 433, at 435 n.6
for a bibliography of articles on reciprocity.
119. ADAMS, WEALTH OF NATIONS 460 (Carman ed. N.Y. 1937).
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quiring the same input-a firm may so enlarge its buying as to give
it the power to increase its sales.'
20
The effect of reciprocal agreements is to deaden competition, for such
contracts deprive competitors of potential markets, similar to the effect of
tying contracts. Such an effect will induce competitors to establish their own
sheltered market, resulting in the capture of a particular market by few firms.
Each successive agreement removes a portion of the total market until it
becomes impossible for any new entries.
These agreements may have disadvantageous consequences to the par-
ticipating firms as well. The "traded" products are frequently not the most
suitable for their intended purposes. Often they are not in the same quality
range as the remainder of the purchaser's line. Furthermore, there are many
instances in which the location of the "trading" firm's plants results in in-
ordinately high shipping charges. Frequently these agreements are entered
into at rates which provide only marginal returns in expectation of insuring
capacity operations. These arrangements once entered into are difficult to
undo, even when they have ceased to serve a useful purpose.1
2
1
The Commission found reciprocal agreements to be unfair trade practices
in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,122 before the
illegality of a conglomerate was ever considered. In Waugh Equipment Co. ;123
Mechanical Mfg. Co.,1 24 and California Packing Corp.,"25 the Commission
found respondents to have violated section 5 by threatening to withdraw
their tremendous shipping volume from various carriers, if they refused to
purchase respondent's products. Such agreements were instrumental in the
du Pont proceedings at the trial level. 126 Also, the recent actions of the anti-
trust agencies indicate that reciprocal agreements may be sufficient to destroy
an otherwise legal merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act; Consolidated
120. Stocking & Mueller, Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30 U. CI.
Bus. J. 73, 77 (1957).
121. Many corporations selling under contract to the Defense Department find them-
selves in this position. They have contracted with the Government on the belief that they
will ensure themselves full production and lower unit costs. Subsequently, their market
expands and they must increase capacity while they are selling a large portion of their
output at a rate which only covers variable cost.
"There may be long-term disadvantages to the company operating on a reciprocity
basis, i.e. higher purchasing costs, poorer quality of suppliers, and complacency and
inefficiency on the part of purchasing and sales personnel." Handler, op. cit. supra note
118, at 435.
122. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
123. 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
124. 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932).
125. 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937).
126. 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1954) ; Stocking & Mueller, op. cit. supra note 120,
at 80-85.
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Foods Corp. v. FTC,127 United States v. General Dynamics12 and United
States v. General Motors' were three conglomerate cases litigated solely
on this point.
In the Consolidated Foods case, Consolidated Foods, a large diversified
processor and seller of food products, acquired the assets of Gentry, a dehy-
drated onion and garlic processor. As a result, Consolidated had the potential
to force all of its suppliers which used onion or garlic to buy from Gentry
rather than some other firm. The Commission found that Consolidated Foods
used reciprocal agreements and ordered divestiture even though by normal
criteria the acquisition would not have violated section 7.130 On appeal the
Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the Commission failed to sustain its
burden of showing that there existed a probability of anti-competitive effects
from the merger."' Yet the court recognized the applicability of section 7 of




In General Dynamics, the charge was against General Dynamics' use of its
superior purchasing power to enable its newly acquired subsidiary, Liquid
Carbonic, to force industrial gases on the General Dynamics' suppliers.
18 3
In General Motors it was alleged that General Motors' salesmen in discussing
the merits of their locomotives suggested that if these merits went unrecog-
nized, General Motors would take its freight business to a more enlightened
carrier. This case was similar to the California Packing Corp. case, for there
was no merger involved.
13 4
Intensive sales campaigns designed to destroy a conglomerate's newly
acquired competitors is also considered by the Commission as an illegal
practice. The Procter and Gamble case is an example. Clorox, the acquired
corporation, was the largest and dominant manufacturer of household bleaches,
having only two national and several smaller regional companies as competi-
tors. The entry of Procter and Gamble, with annual sales exceeding a billion
dollars, soon resulted in serious market reallocation. The disparity between
Clorox and its competitors was magnified, the latter being reduced to fringe
operators. The Commission held that Procter and Gamble's action in the post-
merger period was sufficient to destroy the merger." 5 Broadly construed, this
decision seems to stand for the proposition that an otherwise perfectly ac-
127. 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 912 (1964).
128. 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45062 (1962).
129. 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 45063 (1963).
130. 3 TRADE REG. REP. f 16182 (FTC order 1962).
131. 329 F.2d at 627.
132. Id. at 626.
133. 3 TRADE REG. REP. f" 15773 (FTC order 1962).
134. This case is still riding the trial docket.
135. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16673 (1962).
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ceptable business practice such as advertising will destroy a merger, if it has
enabled the conglomerate to prey on its competitors. The decision is truly
significant, for it foreshadows a new approach. By weighing the effect of the
company's post-merger activities, the Commission has broken away from
analyzation used to predict the combination's abusive potential. Instead it has
looked back and condemns what would otherwise be a legal combination if it
stifles competition. Unfortunately, this case may lose much of its vitality on
appeal. The circuit court can merely affirm by following United States v. El
Paso Natural Gas136 and United States v. Penn-Olin,5 7 where it was decided
that a merger which forecloses potential competition can be illegal. Procter
and Gamble falls squarely within the scope of this holding, for it was a
potential entrant into the household bleach business several years before it
acquired Clorox, and would quite readily foreclose a substantial portion of the
market.
Price cutting, the final post-merger activity to be considered, is a means
often used by conglomerates. A conglomerate by reason of financial superiority
is frequently in a better position to cut prices than its new-found competi-
tors. If a product is offered in one locale at a different price than charged
elsewhere, the firm is engaging in territorial price discrimination. 138 Such
discrimination will result even though the two purchasers in no manner com-
pete with each other'3 9 and the manufacturer is not attempting to gain or
protect a market.1 40 Sales below cost are also prohibited.
141
Two defenses are available in the case of both territorial differentiation
and sales below cost. Prices may vary from area to area if they are cost
136. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
137. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
138. Section 2(a) prohibits different prices to different buyers unless quantity pur-
chases reduce the cost of production. See ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP.
170-76 (1955).
139. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960), modified on remand, 289
F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954) ; cf.
Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 991 (1956). See also AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 46 (2d ed. 1959).
140. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963). Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 346
U.S. 231 (1956) ; Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Note, 51
GEo. L.J. 404 (1962). See generally RowE, op. cit. supra note 139, at 219-20; Note,
Price Discrimination, Gasoline Suppliers, and the Applicability of the Meeting Com-
petition Defense: The Sun Oil Case, 47 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1961).
141. Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Ben Hut Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957) ; cf. Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v.
American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929) (held
that the reduction on price of a nationally sold brand of cigarettes to the same price
charged by the local brands would be viewed as a sale below cost) ; H. J. Heinz Co. v.
Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Gerber Prods. Co. v.
Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
1965]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
justified ;142 they may also be reduced in one locality to meet competition.
1 48
Both defenses are fraught, however, with problems of defining a valid cost
saving and locality.
The Supreme Court was faced with the problem of defining locality
in FTC v. Sun Oil.'44 This controversy arose when the Sun Oil Com-
pany, after considerable self-restraint, reduced the price of gasoline to
one of its stations in Jacksonville, Florida. The cut was designed to meet
recurring price-cutting by this station's nearest competitor. No other Jackson-
ville station received a similar reduction. Sun Oil relied on section 2(b)
which provides a defense only if the reductions are to meet its competitor's
lower prices. 1 45 The Commission, however, refused to apply the "meeting-
competition" defense to this cut. Instead it held that the company should have
reduced the price to all stations directly effected by either the "price-cutter"
or the favored Sun Station.' 46 Although the Fifth Circuit reversed, 147 the
Supreme Court 148 overruled, holding that Sun Oil could not avail itself of the
2(b) defense, because only Sun Oil's independent dealer was meeting competi-
tion, not Sun Oil.
In Reynolds Metals v. FTC,149 a price-cutting charge was combined with
a merger action. The Reynolds Metal Corporation bought the "Arrow Brands"
Company and then cut the price of Arrow's product, florist foil, so that only
a negligible return was possible under the most favorable circumstances. Yet
this price-cutting increased its sales at the expense of the other firms. Instead
of attacking this practice under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act,' °
the Commission attempted to invalidate the acquisition of Arrow under sec-
tion 7. While this merger easily could have been prohibited solely on the
grounds of its potential to lessen competition,' 5' both the Commission 52 and
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered Reynolds'
price-cutting activities before rendering their opinions.153 This decision would
indicate that mergers, otherwise legal, could well become illegal if, after
142. ATT'y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 170-76 (1955). However, bulk rates
are not cost justified. United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962).
143. Section 2(b) 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
144. 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
145. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
146. Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 965 (1959).
147. Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961).
148. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
149. 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
150. Such a suit probably would not have been successful as Reynolds did not
discriminate among retailers with regard to price.
151. As Reynolds acquired one third of the market, no more would seem to be
needed to find a violation of section 7.
152. 56 F.T.C. 743, 763 (1960) ; Note, 13 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1960).
153. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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consummation, it can be shown that the parent firm has the power of a
"deep pocket," "rich parent," "war chest" or "long purse,"' 54 and has entered
into price-cutting activities. 5  It is not beyond the realm of possibility that
the Commission will couple a 2(a) action with a section 7 charge in some
future merger case. The result would be that a 2(a) violation, or unwarranted
price-cutting, coming on the heels of a merger would result in a divestiture
rather than a simple cease-and-desist order.
Perhaps the mere showing of a loss of sales by the smaller firms within
the industry after a giant has entered and cut the price will ultimately be
sufficient justification for a divestiture decree. In fact a modification of this
theory was advanced and rejected in a private antitrust suit. 156 The standards
are somewhat higher in private suits with the plaintiff being required to show
damages to himself directly attributable to defendant's illegal activities. Thus,
this argument was rejected because of a failure to show how the plaintiff was
damaged, rather than a rejection of the theory itself. 157
In summary, the use of such post-acquisition factors in testing the
legality of conglomerate integrations appears to be controlling, at least within
the Federal Trade Commission.
MARKET EXTENSIONS
A market extension is created by the integration of two firms selling similar
products, but in different geographic areas. Such a transaction is anal-
ogous to a horizontal merger, for the principal firm is acquiring a sister
firm. It differs from the horizontal in that the two firms were not competing
prior to their merger. A market extension is also similar to a conglomerate
in that neither involves competing firms, nor do they directly foreclose competi-
tion. It is at this point that all similarity ends.
There are two serious objections to market extensions; they encourage
abusive activities and foreclose potential competition. The latter problem was
recently considered in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.' 58 After two
years of negotiations, the El Paso Natural Gas Company purchased 99.8 per
cent of the Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation's stock. Subsequently,
Pacific Northwest was merged into El Paso, which already had a system of
natural gas pipelines spread throughout the southwestern portion of the
United States. Prior to the merger, El Paso supplied more than 50 per cent
154. New Grant-Patten Milk Co. v. Happy Valley Farms, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 319
(E.D. Tenn. 1963).
155. Note, The Consolidated Foods Case: A New Section 7 Test for the Con-
glomerate Merger, 49 VA. L. REv. 852, 855 (1963).
156. New Grant-Patten Milk Co. v. Happy Valley Farms, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 319
(E.D. Tenn. 1963).
157. Ibid.
158. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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of all gas consumed within California; while Pacific Northwest brought gas
from New Mexico and Canada into Oregon and Washington. This integra-
tion resulted in a true market extension, for neither firm did any business
in the other's marketing area.
The central issue in El Paso was whether the acquisition had a sufficient
tendency to substantially lessen competition in California, the relevant market
area.159 The Court applied the standard of the merger's "probable anti-compet-
itive effect" in place of the traditional "tendency to create a monopoly" stand-
ard, and held that section 7 had been violated.1 60 In other words, the develop-
ment of competition was prevented by this merger, for several competitive acts
in the California area would have been frustrated. This observation can readily
be seen in the several pre-merger transactions of Pacific Northwest. Pacific
Northwest had offered to supply a leading wholesale purchaser with 350 mil-
lion cubic feet of gas per day for 20 years.16 ' In addition, it has previously
negotiated with Southern Edison Company, one of El Paso's buyers; this
forced El Paso to drop its prices to maintain their account. Thus, neither the
existence of competition, nor its reduction need be shown; the mere fore-
closure of potential competition is enough for a section 7 violation.
United States v. Crocker-Angelo Nat'l Bank,'16 2 decided six months prior
to El Paso, refused to enjoin the Crocker-Angelo National Bank from merging
with the Citizens' Bank. There was practically no competition between them,
for Crocker Angelo operated in the San Francisco area, while Citizens' was in
Los Angeles.
In a carefully reasoned opinion, the district court considered and rejected
three theories of illegality. First, a statewide market was assumed, and within
this market, even after the merger, Crocker-Angelo was still only the fourth
largest bank. The court found it difficult to believe the defendant was a poten-
tial monopolist, 163 for the next four banks, including Crocker-Angelo, were
of comparable size. Secondly, they found the contention that the defendant
would create a monopoly without merit.' 64 The final contention that potential
competition in Los Angeles was foreclosed by Crocker-Angelo's acquisition
was also rejected. Two reasons were given for the latter rejection. The
probability of potential competition was slight, for Crocker-Angelo could not,
in contrast to a hardware chain or a dairy, rush into Los Angeles and open
banks; permission is required of the state banking commissioner before open-
ing any bank, and he had indicated such permission would not be forthcom-
159. Id. at 652, 657.
160. Id. at 662.
161. Id. at 660-61.
162. 223 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
163. Id. at 853. But see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
164. Id. at 853-54.
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ing. 65 Furthermore, assuming Crocker-Angelo did enter Los Angeles, it
would only have produced insignificant competition.""0
Although this decision was rendered prior to El Paso, it is almost as
if the court had anticipated it. Judging this merger in relation to its effect
on potential competition foreclosed all but the factual questions. Therefore,
in light of the court's conclusive factual findings, Crocker-Angelo should be
"sustained on appeal."
The Federal Trade Commission was also faced with a situation similar
to El Paso in the Foremost Dairies case. 167 While a market-extension existed
by Foremost's acquisition of Philadelphia Dairy, a stronger case was made
than in El Paso, for limited competition existed at the fringe of both dairies'
marketing area. The Commission ordered Foremost to dispose of this and
several other acquisitions. The logic behind the divestiture order paralleled
that used in El Paso; potential competition had been foreclosed. Unfortunately,
the controversy never received any notoriety since Foremost withdrew its
appeal and agreed to a consent decree.
It seems clear that a merger, presumably legal due to the absence of
direct competition, will be diluted of this effect by the showing of a fore-
closure of potential competition. The standards of Brown Shoe would then
be applied.
Still one question remains unanswered. If the defendant is able to show
that there was no possibility of competition between the merging firms, what
then is the standard?
Market extensions leading to abusive tactics are also viewed unfavorably.
Frequently, a local dairy, bakery, or supermarket will sell out to a national
chain, because it can no longer withstand local competition. The purchaser
may engage in abusive tactics to regain sales, especially if the acquisition has
been at "bargain rates." Short-run losses can be justified as part of the
purchase price rather than as an operating deficiency. Under present thinking,
a company engaging in such tactics will only be subjected to Sherman or
Robinson-Patman Act charges or treble damage suits by private litigants.'0 8
165. Id. at 859.
166. Id. at 856-59.
167. No. 6495, FTC Order, April 30, 1962.
168. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958)
provides: "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee." Prior to the General Electric conspiracy, this section produced less than satisfactory
results. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946) (setting out elements
needed to prove damages).
Few recoveries are recorded for Sherman Act violations, for the courts have generally
applied a restrictive interpretation to this section. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959)
(plaintiff's antitrust violation does not provide a defense to a breached contract), over-
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In all too many instances, this restraint is ineffective. It is submitted that a
combination section 7 and a Sherman or Robinson-Patman charge would
remedy the situation.
A section 7 complaint should be filed against any firms that have extended
their operating area by merger and then have violated the Sherman or Robin-
son-Patman Acts while attempting to force their competitors out of compe-
tition. This approach provides a method of judging these extensions where no
potential competition is foreclosed. It would extend and supplement El Paso.
To date, this approach has only been tried in one rather insignificant FTC case,
and a private antitrust action, New Grant-Patten Milk Co. v. Happy Valley
Farms,16 9 where this theory was rejected. While this rejection might be
indicative of future cases, it had no such influence on National Tea Co.
1 70
In this case, the hearing examiner dismissed the section 7 charges against the
market-extension in question, for there was no showing that the respondent's
store in the geographic market had substantially increased its sales. The
fact that no evidence of abusive or anti-competitive action was introduced,
may have influenced the examiner. Unfortunately, the opinion is almost devoid
of any economic reasoning; it may be reversed by the Commission. If nothing
more the cases indicate that the law in this area is extremely unsettled and
possibly may not be solidified for several years.
ruling Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909);
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902) ; cf. Bement v. National Harrow
Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
The Robinson-Patman Act has fared no better. Until 1961, damages were only
allowed in six of the eighty-five actions brought. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348
U.S. 115 (1954) ($57,000 damages computed after trebling), reversing, 208 F.2d 777
(10th Cir. 1953); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d
950 (10th Cir. 1959) ($30,000); American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co.,
153 F.2d 907 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946) ($10,347) ; Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945)
($3,030) ; Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949),
aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 875 (1951) ($180,000) ; Kentucky-
Tenn. Light & Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. (unreported W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd sub
nom., Fitch v. Ky.-Tenn. Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943) ($176,364).
The more typical result is illustrated by Kidd v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497
(6th Cir. 1961) and Enterprise Indus. Inc. v. The Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957), where an antitrust violation was found but the
plaintiff was unable to prove he was damaged due to the defendant's activities. See
generally Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman
Experience, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 181 (1961); ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 536 (1962); Note, Means of Determining when Treble
Damages Are Recoverable for a Loss Due to a Violation of the Antitrust Laws, 46
CALIF. L. REV. 447 (1958); Note, Proof and Measurement of Damages in Treble
Damage Actions, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1104 (1962).
169. 222 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
170. 3 TRADE REG. REP. fJ 16,376 (1963). Complaints have also been issued in
Campbell Taggart Associated Bakeries, No. 7938, FTC, June 14, 1960; Leslie Salt Co.,
59 F.T.C. 1278 (1961) ; United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Civ. No. 1378P8,
December 9, 1960. The Justice Department alleged Phillips' acquisition of one-hundred-
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JOINT VENTURES
A corporate joint venture, as its name indicates, is a project owned in
part by two or more firms. It may be almost any corporate activity. The
jointly-owned firm may control sources of raw materials or it may function
as a distributor. Frequently, it is a venture into a field entirely new to each
participating firm. The owners need not be corporations, 171 they may be
individuals, or partnerships; nor is equal ownership necessary. Frequently
American corporations join with foreign firms in ventures abroad. 7 2 Oc-
casionally a corporation and a government go into partnership on a particular
project. Essentially all that a joint venture requires is two or more persons
each owning a portion of a project separate from its own operations.
7 3
As joint ventures do not involve the merger of two existing companies,
but instead create a third company as a separate entity, they were con-
sidered outside the scope of section 7.174 The Supreme Court, however, has
recently held that joint ventures are covered under the antitrust acts in the
cases of United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. 1 5 and Pan Am. World
Airlines v. United States.
176
The Penn-Olin case arose when Pennsalt Chemicals and Olin Mathieson
jointly formed the Penn-Olin Chemical Company to produce and sell sodium
chlorate in the Southeast. A 6,500,000 dollar plant was to be built at Calvert
City, Kentucky. Pennsalt, a west coast sodium chlorate manufacturer, would
operate the plant while Olin Mathieson distributed the products. Before Penn-
Olin was formed, neither parent competed with the other in the sale of sodium
million dollars of the Union Oil Company's common stock was a violation of section 7.
Phillips subsequently sold the stock and the complaint was dismissed.
171. Whether the joint venture would fall within the scope of section 7 is
questionable, if one partner, or the venture did not operate in the corporate form. It
would seem that this section applies only to corporations.
172. Note, Jointly Owned Companies Operating Abroad: A Problem in Antitrust
Policy, 47 GEo. L.J. 125 (1958).
173. See Note, Joint Venture Corporations: Drafting the Corporate Papers, 78
HARV. L. Rsv. 393 (1964).
174. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963);
United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963). See also the following Sherman Act cases:
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus.
Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950). Hale, Joint Ventures: Collaborative Subsidiaries and
the Antitrust Laws, 42 VA. L. REv. 927 (1956) ; Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues:
Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REv. 433 (1963) ; Taubman,
Pools, Combinations, Conspiracies and Joint Ventures, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 342, 371
(1959) ; Note, op. cit. supra note 173, at 397-98. Note, The Corporate Joint Venture
under the Antitrust Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 712 (1962); Note, Joint Ventures and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 14 STAN. L. REV. 777 (1962).
175. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
176. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
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chlorate. This venture could not be deemed illegal until two findings were
made: section 7 had to be found applicable to joint ventures; then this particu-
lar operation had to be judged illegal under normal section 7 standards.
The district court was unable to make these findings, thus it dismissed the
complaint. 1 77 In reversing, the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice
Clark first quoted from its du Pont decision to the effect that "any acquisition
by one corporation of all or any part of the stock of another corporation,
competitor or not, is within the reach of the section whenever the reasonable
likelihood appears that the acquisition will result in a restraint of com-
merce."' 7 8 It then reasoned a joint venture would restrain commerce if it
foreclosed either or both parents from entering into a line of trade. Through
the use of the foreclosure of potential competition test, the Court applied the
same philosophy to both a joint venture and a market-extension. Mr. Justice
Clark stated:
... Penn-Olin eliminated the potential competition of the corporation
that might have remained at the edge of the market continually
threatening to enter. Just as a merger eliminates actual competition,
this joint venture may well foreclose any prospect of competition.
• . . Nevertheless, potential competition . . . as a substitute for . . .
[actual competition] may restrain producers from overcharging those
to whom they sell or underpaying those from whom they buy .... 179
Once joint ventures were brought within the scope of section 7, the
Supreme Court could have taken the final step and ruled that the venture
was illegal, for both Pennsalt and Olin Mathieson considered building a plant
in the area and were capable of doing so. Instead, the case was returned to
the district court. On remand that court was instructed to make a finding
"as to the reasonable probability that either one of the corporations would
have entered the market by building a plant, while the other would have
remained a significant potential competitor."180 The district courts generally
have had rather unfortunate experiences with remanded antitrust cases; so it
would not be at all surprising if Penn-Olin is viewed again by the Supreme
Court.
Pan American, a similar case, arose under section 2 of the Sherman
Act.'8 1 In the late twenties, Pan American Airlines joined with the Grace
Lines to form an overseas carrier. This airline, Panagra, was chartered to fly
down the west coast of South America. Panagra neither competes with Pan
177. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
178. 378 U.S. 158, 170 (1964).
179. Id. at 173-74.
180. Id. at 175-76.
181. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
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American nor flies into the United States. Nevertheless, the Justice Depart-
nent challenged Pan American's interest in the company as being a violation
of the monopoly provisions of the Sherman Act. The district court found the
venture acceptable ;182 however, Pan American, by preventing Panagra from
entering the United States and competing with it, was held to have violated
the act. Potential competition was blocked. The validity of this decision was
preserved on appeal even though the case was reversed.'8 3 It now seems
apparent that a joint venture preventing the parent corporation from entering
a line of commerce is illegal, if it fails to meet the criteria laid down in
Brown Shoe.
Several questions arise, however, when a joint venture varies from the
previously mentioned situations. What should be done if the step-child firm
is involved in an activity where it cannot compete with its parent firm?
Perhaps the venture pioneers a new field, and is a method whereby several
companies get into a new industry. What is the effect, if several of the firms
merely put up operating capital and do not actively participate in the opera-
tions of the new firm? Would this bring these firms within the investment
provision of section 7, or are they within the purview of Penn-Olin? It would
seem that the potential harm in any of these cases is offset by the value
society will receive from the development of otherwise unavailable products.
Thus, a claim that these ventures violate the spirit of section 7 is not on sound
ground. At the other end of the spectrum is the joint venture used to control
raw materials or sales outlets used by both parents. Even if the companies
can show they had never contemplated entering this line, these ventures are
almost certain to be deemed illegal; price fixing, market divisions and foster-
182. United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
183. 371 U.S. 296 (1963). The Supreme Court never reached the merits of the
case; instead it deviated onto the question of whether the Justice Department or the
appropriate regulatory agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board, would control mergers
regulated within the industry-a question not within the purview of this Article. The
Justice Department at one time or another has challenged the exemptions given to most
of the regulatory agencies. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665
(1964) (Comptroller of the Currency); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963) (Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and
Federal Reserve Board); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (Securities
Exchange Commission); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296
(1963) (Civil Aeronautics Board); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962) (Federal
Power Commission) ; FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958) (Federal Maritime
Board) ; FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953) (Federal Communica-
tions Commission) ; McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944) (Inter-
state Commerce Commission) ; United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (Dept.
of Agriculture). See also Note, The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to Combinations
Approved under the Bank Merger Act, Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act, 37
N.Y.U.L. REV. 735, 738 (1962) ; Note, Regulated Industries and the Antitrust Laws:
Substantive and Procedural Coordination, 58 CoLuM. L. REV. 673, 679-80 n.56 (1958).
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ing pricing among the parents are inevitable. 184 The Supreme Court is not
unaware of this danger as it pointed out in Penn-Olin:
The joint-venture, like the "merger" and the "conglomeration," often
creates anticompetitive dangers. It is the chosen competitive instru-
ment of two or more corporations previously acting independently
and usually competitively with one another. The result is "a triumvi-
rate of associated corporations.' 8 5
CONCLUSION
The conclusion is two-fold. Any conglomerate merger should be forbidden
whenever and wherever a giant corporation moves into an area dominated
by smaller independent single line firms. The alternative to such prohibition
is an oligopoly. Secondly, a conglomerate involving smaller firms "should be
presumed legal, unless abusive activities growing out of the merger have been
shown. The mere potential to be abusive, however, should not be sufficient
to destroy an otherwise legal merger. Of course, any suppression of the small
competitors must cause the conglomerate to fail. Whether suppression is ac-
complished by illegal Sherman Act activities or by the modern counterparts-
reciprocal sales agreements, price-cutting and unwarranted advertising prac-
tices-makes no difference. Market-extensions and joint ventures which do
not foreclose potential competition should be judged by the same standards.
Those that do foreclose potential competition must meet Brown Shoe standards.
A new procedure also would be required for determining whether mergers
should be challenged. An initial examination would result in mergers being
divided into three categories: those flagrantly violating the statute, and im-
mediately challenged; those too small to affect commerce and thereby dis-
missed; and an intermediate group. Companies falling into the latter group
could be held in abeyance for a period of five years. During this period the
intermingling of manufacturing or distributive facilities would be prohibited. Is 6
184. The same charge could be levied against trade associations. Phelps Dodge Ref.
Corp. v. FTC, 139 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1943). But it has been held that they are outside the
law only if they actually become a vehicle for cooperative pricing, or output control.
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136-37
(1961) ; Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) ; Cement Mfrs.'
Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) ; Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) ; Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 563 (1925) ; National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403
(1923); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) ; Tag Mfrs. Institute v.
FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (Ist Cir. 1949); Gibbs v. McNeeley, 118 Fed. 120 (9th Cir. 1902);
OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, 131-138 (1959).
185. 378 U.S. 158, 169 (1964).
186. This is not a novel proposal, for it was done in both the Brown Shoe and
Philadelphia Bank cases. It now seems to be accepted practice. Muskegon Piston Ring
Co. v. Gulf W. Indus. Inc., 328 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1964).
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If during this trial marriage the conglomerate engaged in abusive activities
the merger would be contested. Surveillance of this magnitude would seem
to be an impossible task, considering the various agencies' limited resources;
however, this is not true for no surveillance is needed. Generally, illegal
practices are quickly called to the attention of the Commission through com-
plaints addressed to Congress, the President or by the Commission itself. It is
at this point that action can be taken.' 8 7 It is submitted that such a procedure
would extend the "rule-of-reason" theory to its logical and equitable con-
clusion.
187. This was the procedure under which the Reynolds case originated.

